Commercial Law by Wyant, C. Judley
Marquette Law Review
Volume 57
Issue 2 1974 (Number 2) Article 3
Commercial Law
C. Judley Wyant
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
C. Judley Wyant, Commercial Law, 57 Marq. L. Rev. 249 (1974).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol57/iss2/3
TERM OF THE WISCONSIN SUPREME
COURT
(AUGUST, 1972 - AUGUST, 1973)
COMMERCIAL LAW
I. CORPORATIONS: DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
The Wisconsin Supreme Court decided two cases this term
involving the law of corporations, both concerning issues of deriva-
tive shareholder actions under Wisconsin Statutes section 180.405.
Rose v. Schantz' came before the court on an appeal overruling a
demurrer to an amended complaint. Plaintiff sought to enjoin a
scheme whereby defendant, president of U.S. Control Corpora-
tion, would deplete the corporate cash reserves, thereby rendering
the corporation incapable of continuing in operation and allowing
defendant to enter into a competing business. Three issues were
presented: (1) whether an aggrieved shareholder must attempt to
secure the desired action of the corporation prior to the commence-
ment of suit, (2) whether an aggrieved shareholder can join a direct
action on his own behalf with the derivative action, and (3) whether
a corporation is a proper party to a derivative suit.
The argument on the first issue centered on whether Wisconsin
Statutes section 180.405(l)(b)2 requires a plaintiff in a derivative
action to allege efforts to secure the actions desired by the plaintiff
and either give written notice or service of a copy of the complaint
on the corporation, or whether an action may be maintained by the
complaint including an allegation of the reasons for not making
such efforts or not giving such notice. Rejecting policy arguments
by both parties, the court looked to the face of the statute, holding
that it stated requirements in the alternative, so that a plaintiff
need only allege that an effort was made or the reasons for not
making such effort.
I. 56 Wis. 2d 222, 201 N.W.2d 593 (1973).
2. WIS. STAT. § 180.405(l)(b) provides as follows:
(1) No action may be instituted or maintained in the right of any domestic or
foreign corporation by the holder or holders of shares or of voting trust certificates
representing shares of such corporation unless:
(b) The plaintiff alleges in the complaint with particularity his efforts to
secure from the board of directors such action as he desires and alleges further
that he has either informed the corporation or such board of directors in
writing of the ultimate facts of each cause of action against each such defen-
dant director or delivered to the corporation or such board of directors a true
copy of the complaint which he proposes to file, and the reasons for his failure
to obtain such action or the reasons for not making such effort.
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This brings Wisconsin Statutes section 180.405(l)(b) in line
with Federal Rule 23.1.3 Indeed, the court looked to the Federal
Rules for help in interpreting this section.' Rule 23.1 recognizes
that in some instances, as in this case, to require a complaining
shareholder to call upon the directors to undertake the action he
desires would be nothing more than a meaningless bit of formality.5
Here, plaintiff would have been required to call upon the other two
directors of the corporation to desist in their actions and to bring
suit against themselves. Such request would certainly have been
futile.
Presumably, the requirement of "particularity" in drafting the
complaint includes "the reason for not making such effort" as it
does in Federal Rule 23.1, although the decision is silent on this
point. Rule Rule 23.1 will not be satisfied with a bare allegation
of the futility of the demand "without allegations of fact showing
how and why the demand would be futile,"' and it seems reasona-
ble that a Wisconsin court, which requires pleadings to be made
3. FFD. R. Civ. P. 23.1 provides as follows:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation
or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it,
the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder
or member at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share or
membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of law, and (2) that the action
is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it
would not otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with particularlity the
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors
or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and
the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The
derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly
situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association. The action shall not
be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such
manner as the court directs.
4. The court looked to Federal Rule 23(b) which was the Federal Rule in force at the
time of the adoption of§ 180.405, WIS. STATS, (1971), quoting the rule at length as follows:
The complaint shall also set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to
secure from the managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the sharehold-
ers such action as he desires, and the reason for notmaking such effort. [Emphasis
supplied by the Court.]
Rule 23 was reorganized in 1966 and those portions dealing with derivative action were
incorporated into the new Rule 23.1 with some additions. While the wording of the section
dealt with here was changed somewhat, it is of no consequence to the question presented
here.
5. 7A C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1831
(1972).
6. Lucking v. Delane, 117 F.2d 159, 160 (6th Cir. 1941).
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with greater specificity than a Federal court, would require at least
as much.
The general rule adopted in resolving the second and third
issues was:
[w]here the injury to the corporation is the primary injury, and
any injury to stockholders secondary, it is the derivative action
alone that can be brought and maintained.7
The injury complained of here, the court held, was primarily and
directly an injury to the corporation and not to the stockholders,
a depreciation in the value of the corporation's stock notwithstand-
ing. Mismanagement on the part of the corporate officers or ma-
jority shareholders has quite generally been held to be primarily
an injury to the corporation, 8 hence the cause of action lies exclu-
sively in a derivative action. This logic leads inextricably to the
conclusion that the corporation is not only a proper, but a neces-
sary party to the action, and that the trial court erred in not strik-
ing the cause of action by Rose individually, as the court so held.
It might be noted, however, that it was recognized in
Marshfield Clinic v. Doege9 that if the wrong complained of also
violated a duty arising on a contract which is owed directly to the
shareholders, an individual shareholder might maintain an action
on his own behalf.'0 This case was limited by its facts to a contract
action, but there is no apparent reason why this principle could not
be extended beyond a contract setting, as for example where the
directors of a corporation held stock as collateral and conspired
to depreciate the stock value so that it might then be purchased at
its reduced value." If, however, the action is not based on some-
thing more than the fiduciary duty owing stockholders by direc-
tors, it will be insufficient to maintain the individual action.,' As a
general rule, though, actions by stockholders will usually involve
an injury directly to the corporation and an attorney will most
often be bringing a derivative action for recovery from such
injuries.
7. 56 Wis. 2d at 229, 201 N.W.2d at 598.
8. 13 W. FIETCIER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5924 (2d ed. 1970), although Cali-
fornia has recently held contra. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d
4464 (1969).
9. 269 Wis. 519, 69 N.W.2d 558 (1954).
10. Id. at 527, 69 N.W.2d at 562.
II. Ritchie v. McMullen, 79 F. 522 (6th Cir. 1897) cert. denied 168 U.S. 710. This and
other cases illustrating this rule are collected at Annot., 167 A.L.R. 279, 287 (1947).
12. 56 Wis. at 2d 228, 229, 201 N.W.2d at 597.
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Berke v. Berke" presented a slightly different problem than
Rose. Defendant demurred to plaintiff's complaint on the grounds
that plaintiff was not a registered shareholder within the meaning
of Wisconsin Statutes section 180.405(a) 4 and, therefore, lacked
standing to bring this derivative action. Prior to the action, but
subsequent to the injuries complained of, plaintiff transferred all
of his stock in the corporation to a trust for the benefit of his
children, naming himself trustee. This action, defendant argued,
placed plaintiff outside the statutory meaning of registered stock-
holder, making him ineligible to bring this action.
The court deftly pointed out the "elementary principle of law"
that title to property placed in trust vests in the trustee, and when
a settlor of a trust names himself as sole trustee there is no transfer
of property. 5 It is clear then that plaintiff was a registered stock-
holder at the time of the injury and continued as such following
the creation of the trust. Consequently, he had standing to sue as
the trial court had concluded.
II. AGENCY
Exactly when an employer is subject to liability for the acts
of his employee has created problems for the courts and attorneys
for a number of years. With the adoption of workmen's compensa-
tion legislation, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was obliged to de-
velop a broader test of employers' liability for the negligent acts
of their employees than was recognized under common law. In an
earlier case 6 the court recognized that the language of the statute
which provides that for recovery an injury need only arise "out of
and incidental to his employment"' 7 must create a broader test
which extends recovery beyond the common law test of "scope of
employment" if the principles inherent in workmen's compensa-
13. 56 Wis. 2d 369, 202 N.W.2d 688 (1972).
14. WIs. STAT. § 180.405(i)(a) (1971) quoted at length:
(I) No action may be instituted or maintained in the right of any domestic or
foreign corporation by the holder or holders of shares or of voting trust certificates
representing shares of such corporation unless:
(a) The plaintiff alleges in the complaint that he was a registered share-
holder or the holder of voting trust certificates at the time of the transaction
or any part thereof of which he complains or that his shares or voting trust
certificates thereafter devolved upon him by operation of law from a holder
who was a holder at the time of the transaction or any part thereof com-
plained of.
15. 56 Wis. 2d at 372, 202 N.W.2d at 690.
16. Barragar v. Industrial Comm'n, 205 Wis. 550, 238 N.W. 368 (1931).
17. WIS. STAT. § 102.03(l)(c) (1971).
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tion are to be implemented. The "broader" or "arising from the
employment" test, however, is limited to an employee wishing to
recover for injuries sustained by himself and does not extend to a
third party seeking recovery from an employer for the negligent
acts of his employees.
In two recent decisions, Wourinen v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co.'1 and Finsland v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 9
the court rejected an opportunity to extend the broader test and
made it quite clear that a third party seeking recovery from an
employer for injuries resulting from the negligent act of his em-
ployee will be allowed such recovery only if the injury was sus-
tained while the employee was acting within the "scope of employ-
ment," the common law or "respondeat superior" test.
In Wourinen v. State Farm Mutual, plaintiff sought recovery
for personal injuries resulting from an automobile collision be-
tween Wesley Felice, driver and owner of the car in which plaintiff
was a passenger and Walter Semenock, a member of the Wiscon-
sin National Guard. At the time of the accident, Semenock was
driving his personally owned vehicle while returning from two
weeks active duty at Camp McCoy. He was on normal off-duty
hours and was not required to report until the following morning
at the Rhinelander armory where his unit is normally headquar-
tered when not on active duty. If Semenock had not been traveling
in his own vehicle, he would have returned by convoy with his unit
the next day. The issue presented the court was whether Semen-
ock's activities might subject the State of Wisconsin, an interven-
ing defendant, to liability under Wisconsin Statutes sections 21.1320
and 270.58.21 The supreme court found that they would not, and
18. 56 Wis. 2d 44, 201 N.W.2d 521 (1972).
19. 57 Wis. 2d 267, 204 N.W.2d 201 (1973).
20. WIS. STAT. § 21.13 (1971) provides as follows:
If any member of the national guard or the state guard is prosecuted by any civil
or criminal action for any act performed by such member while in the performance
of his military duty and in pursuance thereof, the action against such member may,
in the discretion of the governor, be defended by counsel appointed therefor by the
governor upon the recommendation of the attorney general. The costs and expenses
of any such defense shall be audited by the department of administration and paid
out of the state treasury and charged to the special counsel appropriation in s. 20.455
and if the jury or court finds that the member of the national guard against whom
the action is brought acted in good faith the judgment as to damages entered against
him shall also be paid by the state.
21. Wis. STAT. § 270.58 (1971) provides as follows:
Where the defendant in any action or special proceeding is a public officer or
employee and is proceeded against in his official capacity or is proceeded against as
1974]
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affirmed the decision of the lower court in directing a verdict in
favor of the intervening defendant.
In the second of these two decisions, Finsland v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co., plaintiff was injured by an automobile driven by Dayle
Hunter, an employee of defendant. Hunter managed a local filling
station for defendant and part of his duties included forwarding a
report and receipt of the previous day's business by way of a money
order. Hunter, however, had detoured eight blocks from the most
direct route to the place of purchase of the money order to pick
up his wife, who was to accompany him downtown. The accident
occurred before he picked her up. The issue presented was whether,
under the facts, there were grounds upon which plaintiff might
maintain a cause of action against defendant. The court held the
trial court properly ruled that when Hunter had turned to pick up
his wife he was not involved in a dual purpose on behalf of his
employer, nor was he acting within the scope of his employment.
In arriving at their decision, the court explained that the
"broader" test allows for recovery of injuries growing out of and
incidental to the employment, which does not require that the
employee show a causal relationship between the employment and
the accident, nor that the employee's activity at the time of the
injury would have benefited the employer,"2 as, for example, when
an employee who signed an alleged communist-backed peace peti-
tion was injured by an attack of fellow employees while performing
his assigned work. 3 An earlier decision, Butler v. Industrial
Commission,4 explained that the circumstances surrounding an
employment situation may be thought of as creating a "zone of
special danger" and if the employee's injury arose from that zone,
recovery would be allowed under the statutory language "out of
an individual because of acts committed while carrying out his duties as an officer
or employee and the jury or the court finds that he acted in good faith the judgment
as to damages and costs entered against the officer or employee shall be paid by the
state or political subdivision of which he is an officer. or employee. Regardless of the
results of the litigation the governmental unit shall pay reasonable attorney's fees
and costs of defending the action, unless it is found by the court or jury that the
defendant officer or employee did not act in good faith, when it does not provide
legal counsel to the defendant officer or employee. Deputy sheriffs in those counties
where they serve not at the will of the sheriff but on civil service basis shall be covered
by this subsection, except that the provision relating to payment of the judgment shall
be discretionary and not mandatory. In such counties the judgment as to damages
and costs may be paid by the county if approved by the county board.
22. 205 Wis. 550, 238 N.W. 368 (1931).
23. Nash-Kelvinator v. Industrial Comm'n., 266 Wis. 81, 62 N.W.2d 567 (1954).
24. 265 Wis. 380, 385, 61 N.W.2d 490, 492 (1953).
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and incidental to his employment." ' This was thought to allow
recovery under workmen's compensation, where a peace officer,
for example, responded to an emergency outside of his jurisdiction,
which he knew to be outside of his jurisdiction, and to be contrary
to his employment instructions because his employment put him
in a position where he would be situated to receive these calls .2
Under the Wourinen v. State Farm rule, however, the "broader"
or "arising from the employment" test will not cover third parties,
who will continue to be required to come under the "scope of
employment" test.
The "scope of employment" test exposes the employer to sub-
stantially less potential liability. Under this test for a plaintiff to
recover from an employer for injuries resulting from the negligent
use of a motor vehicle by an employee, the plaintiff must show that
the employee used the vehicle with the knowledge and consent of
the employer and that the vehicle was used in the scope of employ-
ment in facilitating the employer's business.27 An employee is held
to be acting without the scope of his employment when his activity
is different in kind from that authorized; far beyond authorized
spatial or time limits; or insufficiently actuated by a purpose to
serve the employer.2 Recovery is also allowed if the employee has
used the vehicle for a personal as well as business purpose when
nothing is done which is inconsistent with the scope of employment
for which the vehicle was taken and in furtherance of the em-
ployer's business, as when a business delivery is made to the same
place where personal business is to be conducted.29
The key to determine scope of employment, and thus recovery
against the employer, lies in the fact of the employer's right to
control.3 If the employer has authorized a specific instrument or
mode but has not assumed control over it, the employee will not
be acting within the scope of employment. 3' Recovery against an
employer, for example, was denied a third party when an employer
permitted but did not require an employee to travel to another
jobsite in his own vehicle and an alternate means of transportation
was available.32 Here, Semenock was returning home in his own
25. Wjs. STAT. § 102.03(I)(c) (1971).
26. 265 Wis. 380, 61 N.W.2d 490 (1953).
27. Eckel v. Richter, 191 Wis. 409, 211 N.W. 158 (1926).
28. Strak v. Strak, 12 Wis. 2d 537, 541, 107 N.W.2d 632, 633, 634 (1961).
29. 191 Wis. 409, 211 N.W. 158 (1926).
30. 56 Wis. 2d at 54, 201 N.W.2d at 526.
31. Id. at 55, 201 N.W.2d at 527.
32. 12 Wis. 2d 537, 107 N.W.2d 632.
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vehicle, the Wisconsin National Guard had no control over him,
and he was on his own time. He was under no direction of his
superiors and, therefore, was not deemed to have been acting
within the scope of his employment.
Further, recovery will not be allowed when the employee de-
parted from his employment duties, as Hunter did when he de-
toured to pick up his wife. As a general rule a slight deviation will
not necessarily relieve an employer of liability from the employee's
action. 3 It has been held in Wisconsin, however:
[t]he departure of the servant from the scope of his employment
may as measured in terms of time or space be very slight, never-
theless if the act performed be one in furtherance of his own
purposes and without the scope of his employment the master is
not liable.34 [Emphasis added.]
Yet the language of Thomas v. Lockwood Oil Co., "... must be
so substantial as to amount to a departure therefrom and for pur-
poses entirely personal to the servant . . . ,",31 was cited with
approval in Finsland v. Phillips Petroleum Co. No reference was
made to the fact situation in that case, however, where a defen-
dant's employee detoured three blocks for the purposes of delaying
his return to the employer's place of business so as to preclude his
being sent on further deliveries that day and in hopes of a chance
encounter with a young lady he had had recently met and whom
he knew lived on one of the blocks, although he did not know her
last name. An employee will also be held to be acting within his
scope of employment when he abandons a departure and returns
to his duties. 6
It is obvious, then, that the "scope of employment" test is much
more restrictive than the "broader" test and the net result of
Wourinen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. and
Finsland v. Phillips Petroleum Co. is a limitation of an employer's
liability for an employee's negligent acts by refusing to extend the
latter of those two tests. Although these cases state no new law,
their importance is that they firmly limit, for good or bad, the
employer's guarantee of protection afforded the public for the neg-
ligent acts of employees.
33. Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 8, 58 (1957).
34. 191 Wis. at 412, 211 N.W.at 159.
35. 174 Wis. 486, 182 N.W. 841 (1921).
36. Id.
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In Gregory v. Sella,"7 the court dealt with another aspect of
agency, the real estate broker as agent. Plaintiffs, husband and
wife, brought suit to recover damages resulting from defendant's
refusal to tender payment for and accept the deed of plaintiffs'
home pursuant to an executed offer to purchase agreement. Plain-
tiff, Mrs. Gregory, was at all relevant times a licensed real estate
broker, but for three years prior to the transaction from which the
litigation arose had not been active in this occupation. Defendant
argued, by way of defense, that Mrs. Gregory, by virtue of being
a licensed real estate broker, entered into a fiduciary relationship
whereby she dealt with the public and which she had violated.
Consequently, defendant was justified in her breach.
A previous decision, Rusch v. Wald, held that:
[t]he purpose and method of licensing real-estate brokers to do
business and limiting this field to those so duly licensed creates
a relation between the broker and the public dealing with him
which places on him an obligation commensurate with the advan-
tage he has in the general knowledge that he is designated as one
having special understanding and information concerning the
things affecting his particular vocation.3
The court, however, held that his case was not on point and rea-
soned that any fiduciary duty between a real estate broker and the
public arises only when the broker assumes a role of agent, point-
ing out a "fundamental distinction between brokers and brokers
who are agents." 9 Even though the real estate examining board
is empowered to revoke the license of a salesman or a broker for
any untruth the reliance on which causes damage to either a vendor
or purchaser,0 the court nevertheless found a fiduciary relationship
arises only when the broker has begun to act on a person's behalf.
Indeed, Mrs. Gregory was under no legal obligation to disclose her
prior experience. The fiduciary relationship, it was found, is estab-
lished when "confidence is reposed on one side and there is a
resulting superiority and influence on the other,"4 and the agency
for this confidential relationship will arise when there is a "mani-
festation of consent by one person to another that the other shall
37. 58 Wis. 2d 367, 206 N.W.2d 147 (1973).
38. 202 Wis. 462, 463, 464, 232 N.W. 875 (1930).
39. 58 Wis. 2d at 371, 206 N.W.2d at 150.
40. WIs. STAT. § 452.10(2)(a) and (b) (1971).
41. 58 Wis. 2d at 372, 206 N.W.2d at 150, citing with approval Nolan v. Wisconsin Real
Estate Broker's Board, 3 Wis. 2d 510, 533, 89 N.W.2d 317, 330 (1958).
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act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the
other to so act."4 2
This may prove to be a rather unfortunate decision, in light of
the fact that the court has decided, in an earlier decision, that a
real estate broker is competent to handle certain arrangements for
the sale of real property without the assistance of legal counsel. 3
While Mrs. Gregory was no longer associated with the agency
involved and it was her own house being sold, the language of the
decision makes no distinction between a person in Mrs. Gregory's
position and a situation where an unscrupulous broker might in-
duce an unsuspecting buyer to act in a manner adverse to his best
interest which is not based on a "substantial misrepresentation" or
a "false promise," where a confidence is reposed in the broker, but
the broker has not consented. Such activity would be permissible
under Gregory v. Sella, yet a violation of public interest and the
Rusch v. Wald principles."
III. COMMERCIAL DEALINGS: SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND
CONTRACT FORMATION
A number of issues of some importance in commercial dealings
came before the court this term. The problem of the rights of a pre-
paying buyer vis-a-vis a secured party and the question of a secured
party's burden in establishing commercial reasonableness of a pri-
vate sale of secured collateral were decided by the court. Also
treated under the sales article of the Uniform Commercial Code
were a classic case of a "battle of the forms" under section 2-207
and a problem of contract formation where terms of the agreement
were left open.
42. Id., n. 7, citing RESTATEMENT (Second) AGENCY, § I.
43. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961).
44. Rush v. Wald, 202 Wis. at 464, 232 N.W. at 875, 876, recognized that a confidential
relationship need not require an assent by the real estate agent and found merely that:
[i]f a broker deceives and misleads one into making a contract to the broker's or his
principal's undue advantage and does so under such circumstances that trust and
confidence are reposed on the one side and the influence of his recognized and
licensed position and the impression of superior knowledge accompanying it are
exercised on the other, the customer has a cause of action for rescission or damages,
providing, of course, the customer has acted within proper limitations as to the
exercise of prudence and diligence.
Such a situation had arisen earlier in Miranovitz v. Gee, 163 Wis. 246, 157 N.W. 790 (1916)
where plaintiffs, unlettered immigrants with only a limited understanding of English, relied
on misrepresentations made by defendant, a fellow countryman and friend, in the purchase
of certain real property that defendant knew to be of considerably less value than what he
had advised plaintiffs.
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Vic Hansen and Sons, Inc. v. Crowley45 follows a long line of
Wisconsin decisions dealing with a secured party's duties in selling
secured collateral. As early as 1905 a secured party had been held
to owe a duty to obtain the best price possible on the sale of the
secured property,46 and in the recent past it was reaffirmed that a
deficiency judgment will be allowed only if there has been a valid
resale. Most recently the Wisconsin Supreme Court indicated its
great disfavor of the use of "private" sales for the disposal of the
secured property by denying a deficiency judgment where each
aspect of the sale cannot be shown to be commercially reasonable
and by placing the burden of showing the "private" sale to be
commercially reasonable upon the secured party.
In Vic Hansen and Sons, plaintiff, a used car dealer, attempted
to recover a deficiency judgment following the private sale of an
automobile, of which it held a valid secured interest, resulting from
defendant's default of payment. Plaintiff purchased the vehicle
from itself by crediting defendant with seven hundred dollars. This
credit and the rebate of the prepaid insurance and interest were
deducted from the amount still owing and plaintiff then sought a
deficiency judgment on the remaining portion. The trial court de-
nied judgment and plaintiff appealed. On appeal the court held that
the plaintiff failed to establish the sale was conducted in a commer-
cially reasonable manner and that plaintiff, therefore, failed in
establishing the amount of the deficiency judgment. In reaching
this decision the court outlined the framework within which com-
mercial reasonableness is to be considered and determined with
whom the burden of proof lies in establishing commercial
reasonableness.
It was held that to be commercially reasonable, a disposition
of the collateral of a secured transaction must be calculated to gain
the best possible price. For a deficiency judgment to be granted
every aspect of the sale, including the price, must be shown to be
commercially reasonable. The secured creditor need not go to ex-
traordinary means in arranging for such a sale, nor will he be
bound to sell either at a retail or wholesale rate. If more can be
realized by sales through retail outlets and the seller is in the
business of distributing through these outlets, commercial reasona-
45. 57 Wis. 2d 106, 203 N.W.2d 728 (1973).
46. Kellog v. Malick, 125 Wis. 239, 103 N.W. 1116 (1905).
47. James Talcott, Inc. v. P. & J. Contracting Co., 27 Wis. 2d 68, 133 N.W.2d 799
(1964).
19741
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
bleness demands that the sale be made through the retail outlets.4
The seller is also barred from making money on the sale.
After looking at a number of decisions from foreign jurisdic-
tions,49 the court also went on to recognize that the secured party
selling secured property at a "private" sale has the burden of prov-
ing the commercial reasonableness of the sale.
A second point of defense was raised in that the purchase agree-
ment of the vehicle was signed in blank, a violation of Wisconsin
Statutes section 218.01(6)(c)" and there was evidence to indicate
that his practice was part of plaintiff's normal routine, which
prompted the court to find that such an agreement is void.
There was a number of minor points in this case that seemed
to be ignored with a possible detriment to future litigation. The
most apparent is the uncertainty of the "best price" language in
view of the holding that "extraordinary means" are not required
to attain this price. While the overall thrust of the decision is
clearly to discourage private sales of secured property, there may
conceivably be times when there is no recognizable market for
some collateral which is to be sold, with the consequence that a
secured party might be hard put to show the "best price" was
obtained, even though all other elements of the sale might be
shown to be commercially reasonable. This is a significant depar-
ture from the general rule that a secured party disposing of collat-
eral need only show commercial reasonableness in the sale, albeit
the decisions so holding deal with public sales.5 Indeed, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has held that commercial reasonableness
negates the best price duty by definition. 2 A secured party might
48. 57 Wis. 2d at 115, 203 N.W.2d at 733, citing with approval, Cities Service Oil Co.
v. Ferris, 9 U.C.C. Rptr. 899 (D.C. Mich. 1971).
49. First National Bank of Bellevus v. Rose, 188 Neb. 362, 196 N.W.2d 507 (1972);
Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v. Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970); Fryer & Willis
Drilling Co. v. Oilwell, 472 S.W.2d 857; Elkman v. Mountain Motors, Inc., 364 P.2d 998
(Wyo. 1961); In re Bro Cliff, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rptr. 1144 (D.C. Mich. 1971).
50. WIs. STAT. § 218.01(6)(c) (1971) reads as follows:
An exact copy of the installment sale contract and any note or notes given in
connection therewith shall be furnished by the seller to the buyer at the time the buyer
signs such contract. The buyer's copy of the contract shall contain the signature of
the seller identical with the signature on the original contract. No contract shall be
signed in blank except that a detailed description of the motor vehicle including the
serial number or other identifying marks of the vehicle sold which are not available
at the time of execution of such contract may be filled in before final delivery of the
motor vehicle.
51. But see, Uniform Commercial Code (herein after cited U.C.C.) § 9-504, comment
I; Northern Financial Corp. v. Kosterson, 31 Ohio App. 2d 256, 287 N.E.2d 923 (1971).
52. Hutchinson v. Southern California First National Bank, 27 Cal. App. 3d 526, 103
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also be confronted with a situation where several commercially
reasonable alternatives exist and one is later shown to have been
able to generate the best price, but that alternative was not chosen.
The "best price" duty also seems to be adverse to the U.C.C.53
A second point that might be raised is the court's disapproval
of profit being made on the sale and the approval of sale through
the secured party's outlets if this will insure the best price. This
forces a secured party to sell the collateral through its normal retail
outlets without a profit. Presumably, the secured property is sold
in place of similar property that would have been sold at a profit.
The secured party thereby has been denied a profit on the sale that
would have been made had he not been forced to sell the collateral
in its place.54
Nevertheless, situations where a secured party is at a loss to
find a recognized market or will have retail outlets through which
the sale can be accomplished are limited. It is advisable, then, to
discourage a client from selling collateral by way of a private sale.
If a client should insist, however, he should be informed of the
great disfavor with which such sales are viewed by the court and
of the burden of proof he will sustain should he be forced to justify
such a sale either through challenge or to take a deficiency judg-
ment. A secured party is probably more prudent to sell foreclosed
collateral in a "recognized market," at a price "current in such
market" or by means of the "reasonable commercial practices"
among dealers, as the court has encouraged.5
In Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc.,56 the issue focused on the
position of a prepaying buyer. The problem arises when a creditor
who holds a secured interest in a debtor's inventory attempts to
foreclose on that interest and a buyer has transferred substantial
amounts of money under a prepayment arrangement for goods
included in theinventory. Such a situation was presented to the
court for the first time in this action.
Chrysler, the buyer in this case, entered into two agreements
dated a year apart for the manufacturing of certain specialized
machinery by the debtor, Adamatic. The creditor, Lakeshore
Commercial Finance Corporation, held a perfected security inter-
Cal. Rptr. 816 (1972).
53. U.C.C. § 9-507(2).
54. U.C.C. § 2-708(2), for example, provides that lost profits are to be included in
damages resulting from breach of contract.
55. U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
56. 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97 (1973).
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est in debtor's inventory at all times material to this action. Upon
completion, the machinery called for under the first agreement was
sent to the buyer. No notice was ever given by the buyer of any
rejection and the machine was tagged with an asset number by the
buyer. The machine was returned to the debtor six months later,
however, for some adjustments. In the meantime work was begun
on the three machines called for under the second agreement,
which were to be completed at various intervals. The agreement
also called for progress payments of 80 per cent of the value of the
completed work when the machines were 25 per cent completed.
Debtor's financial picture, however, which had always been
shakey, deteriorated rapidly and the creditor foreclosed on all of
its loans outstanding, claiming a secured interest in the machines
present. Buyer attempted to replevin the machines in question.
The court held that title to the machine returned to the debtor
for repairs had passed to the buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness,5" hence the buyer was protected from the creditor's security
interest.5 8 It was an entirely different situation, however, with re-
gard to the remaining incompleted machines. The issue was raised
as to whether a buyer could be deemed to be a buyer in the ordi-
nary course of business so as to cut off a creditor's rights in the
secured property even though it had never taken possession of the
property by delivery.
The court conceded that if the buyer was a buyer in the ordi-
nary course of business its title could not be defeated merely be-
cause it never took possession of the secured property. 9 Under the
circumstances, however, the court concluded that the buyer could
not be considered a buyer in the ordinary course of business. The
goods were so far short of completion as not to be identifiable to
the contract nor could the buyer be said to have taken the goods
by delivery when possession was established by a replevin action.
The status of a buyer in the ordinary course of business, it was
decided, is determined at the time a buyer actually takes possession
of the goods. The court further explained that a creditor should be
able to assume that all property in the possession of a person is
unencumbered unless public records or personal knowledge dem-
onstrate otherwise. 60
57. WIS. STAT. § 402.606(l).
58. 59 Wis. 2d at 235, 208 N.W.2d at 105.
59. WIs. STAT. § 409.307(l) (1971).
60. The Court relied upon a finding in a prior case, Columbia International Corp. v.
Kempler, 46 Wis. 2d 550, 559, 175 N.W.2d 465 (1970) where it was found:
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This decision clearly demonstrates the exposed position of a
prepaying buyer where a creditor holds a secured interest on a
debtor's inventory. The buyer had, in effect, financed the manufac-
turing of its machines, yet had nothing to show for the expense.
The Court admitted the inequities of the situation but suggested,
in light of the large size of the contract and the modesty of the
debtor's assets, the buyer should have negotiated a security interest
in the machines.
Two cases of some importance dealt with the sales section of
the Uniform Commercial Code. Air Products & Chemical, Inc. v.
Fairbanks"' treated the question of the "battle of the forms" under
section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 which was de-
signed to mitigate the common law rules of offer and counter-offer.
Under the common law, unless an acceptance was identical to the
offer, it would only be construed as a counter-offer which would
be minimal in its acceptance lest the second acceptance be con-
strued as a second counter-offer, ad infinitum.3 Such mechanical
application has no real place in contemporary commercial practice
where great volumes of goods and an ever-increasing number of
contracts for such shipments rely on an exchange of business
forms.
people should be able to deal with a debtor upon the assumption that all property in
his possession is unencumbered, unless the contrary is indicated by their own knowl-
edge or by public records.
This rejects the argument that most financing institutions do not rely on the property in a
debtor's possession when deciding whether or not to make a loan.
61. 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
62. U.C.C. § 2-207 reads as follows:
(I) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirma-
tion which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it
states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within
a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not
otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract
consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
63. I R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (2d ed., 1970) (hereinafter referred
to as ANDERSON) § 2-207.5, p. 343.
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Air Products presented a classic "battle of the forms" fact
situation to the court. A large part of this case was decided under
Pennsylvania law by stipulation; consequently much of it is of little
relevance to Wisconsin law. Those portions of the decision dealing
with section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, however, will
doubtlessly be held controlling in Wisconsin in the future.
In this action, plaintiff sued to recover for damages resulting
from defendant's breach of the warranty of marketability and fit-
ness, and defendant raised an affirmative defense to plaintiff's
cause of action on the grounds it had disclaimed any warranty by
terms found on the reverse side of its acknowledgment of order
form. Defendant's acknowledgment of order form indicated that
plaintiff's order was accepted and would be governed by the provi-
sions found on the reverse side, the sixth of which was a disclaimer
of warranties. Both parties agreed that section 2-207 was control-
ling, defendant contending that its acknowledgment of order be-
came part of the contract and plaintiff arguing that since it never
assented to it, the contract could not be limited by the disclaimer.
In deciding these matters the court laid down a step by step
methodology to be used in determining matters under section 2-
207. The first step is to determine if the parties have a deal. Here,
language in defendant's acknowledgment of order evinced an in-
tent to accept, so the deal was made. Next it is to be determined
whether the acceptance is expressly conditioned on the additional
or different terms. If so, it is a counter-offer. Here there was no
such limitation. A legally binding agreement may be formed even
with terms different or additional to the offer provided acceptance
is not conditioned on the new terms. Section 2-207 will become
operative only after deviant terms and an acceptance not expressly
prefaced on that term has been found. Section 2-207(2) provides
that unless the deviant terns materially alter the agreement or the
offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer or objec-
tion is raised, they become terms of a contract between merchants.
Here the latter two considerations were inapplicable and the issue
to be. resolved was whether the disclaimer of warranties was a
material alteration of the terms agreed to, which the court found
in favor of the plaintiff.
While this decision was ostensibly decided under Pennsylvania
law, there is no doubt that it will be of the greatest importance in
Wisconsin. The U.C.C. is, of course, national in scope and Wis-
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consin Statute section 402.207(2), 64 which would not have altered
this decision even in its old form, is identical to Title 12A of the
Pennsylvania Statutes, section 2-207, but most important, this de-
cision is squarely in line with what is generally held to be the best
interpretation of this section. 65 By disapproving defendant's argu-
ment that it had properly disclaimed any warranties (possibly de-
fendant argued that their acknowledgment of order constituted a
counter-offer, but the decision is hazy on this point), the court
rejected the rule of the much-criticized" case of Roto-Lith, Ltd. v.
F.P. Bartlett & Co.67 By refusing to adopt plaintiffs distinction
between "additional" and "different"68 terms, the court rejected
the rule of American Parts v. Arbitration Association,6 thus bring-
ing itself in line with the most accepted decisions involving section
2.207. It is difficult, therefore, to conceive of the Court reversing
itself in the near future. Even though Air Products & Chemical,
Inc. v. Fairbanks came down under Pennsylvania law, it will
doubtless be of major influence in Wisconsin for a long time.
The second of the two cases dealing with contracts, Peninsular
Carpets, Inc. v. Bradley Homes, Inc. ,7 involved an entirely differ-
ent question, that of ambiguity in the formation of a contract.
Ambiguity in the meaning of some word or words within a contract
is the basis for numerous appeals. Most, however, add but slightly
to the development of the law and are, as a result, of little interest,
save for the parties involved, and are generally limited to their fact
situations. The ambiguity involved in Peninsular Carpets, however,
altered the normal pattern of facts of prior decisions. The question
of ambiguity in it was not directed to the meaning of the word or
words used in a contract already formed, but rather directed to the
question whether the words used gave rise to the contract itself.
This case came before the court on an appeal from an order
denying plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff alleged
the formation of a contract for the purchase of certain quantities
of carpeting and carpet padding between itself and defendant. De-
64. Laws of 1969, chapter 34 § 4 was amended by deleting the words "or different" after
the word "additional" in Wis. STAT. 402.207(2) (1971) which brought this section into
conformity with the uniform act.
65. See ANDERSON, § 2-207.
66. See, for example, ANDERSON § 2-207.5; 17 A.L.R.3d 1010, 1056, n. 10 (1968).
67. 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
68. 58 Wis. 2d at 211, 206 N.W.2d at 423.
69. 8 Mich. App. 156, 154 N.W.2d 5 (1967).
70. 58 Wis. 2d 405, 206 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
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fendant, by way of answer, alleged that a document presented as
evidence of the alleged contract by the plaintiff was executed, but
denied that such document was intended as a contract. The docu-
ment, according to the defendant, was only a memorandum of
terms later to be incorporated into the contract. Certain statements
taken from the deposition of defendant's employee were also made
part of the record. Parts of this deposition indicated an intent by
the employee to bind defendant by the document submitted by
plaintiff, but other portions of the document indicated that the
document was thought of as only a memorandum and that the
contract was expected to be forwarded at a later time. The court
concluded that there was sufficient ambiguity left unsettled by the
documents and affidavits submitted to warrant a denial of the
motion for summary judgment and, consequently, affirmed the
lower court.
In reaching this result the court reasoned that whether the
question of whether the document presented by plaintiff was a
contract or a memorandum is correctly a question of intent. Wis-
consin Statutes section 402.204(3)"' provides that if parties to a
contract intend to make a contract, the contract formed will not
fail for indefiniteness even though terms may be left open and the
intent of the parties is an issue of fact. Summary judgment, there-
fore, is inappropriate.
It is well established in Wisconsin that the construction of an
ambiguous contract is a matter of law and when there is an ambi-
guity a determination of the meaning of a word or words used is a
question of fact.72 The issue in this case was whether the contract
had been formed. The ambiguity was in the words used in the
formation of the alleged contract and, prior to Peninsular Carpets,
there was no appropriate test. The accepted analysis of ambiguity
with a contract has come to be:
[w]hen the language of a contract, considered as a whole, is
reasonably or fairly susceptible to different constructions, it is
therefore ambiguous, and such being the situation, the sense in
which the words are therein used is a question of fact.73
71. WIs. STAT. § 402.204(3) (1971) reads as follows:
Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for
indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasona-
bly certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.
72. W.P. Woodall v. Democrat Printing Co., 250 Wis. 348, 27 N.W.2d 437 (1947).
73. Lemke v. Larsen Co., 35 Wis. 2d 427, 431, 432, 151 N.W.2d 17, 19 (1967).
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This language, of course, was used to determine the meaning of
words within a contract already formed. The reasoning is sound,
however, and so this language has now been applied by the court
to situations where a question of ambiguity arises regarding the
meaning given words upon the formation of a possible contract.
C. JUDLEY WYANT
CRIMINAL LAW
I. EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the term just completed,
dealt with a number of aspects concerning "effective counsel" in
criminal matters. The Court prescribed the length of time a defense
counsel's responsibility extends to his client;1 ruled on the number
of defendants one lawyer may represent in one case;2 and, in one
of the more important decisions of the term, changed the standards
by which "effective counsel" is determined.
3
The question of what is effective counsel has become increas-
ingly prevalent. This area is a most difficult one because such a
question can only be answered on a case by case basis: by encom-
passing the rights of the defendant, the facts of the case and the
professional judgment and strategy of the defense counsel. The
rights of the defendant are defined by both the Federal and State
Constitutions, and by extensive case law. The facts of the case are
presented in the trial court's record and in effect form the basis of
review for the supreme court. It is the last two factors, professional
judgment and strategy of the defense counsel, that present the most
problems. These factors are nebulous at best and any attempt to
mold them into a set formula is an extremely difficult task.
In an attempt to deal with factors of professional judgment and
strategy the court held in State v. Simmons4 that an evidentiary
hearing must be held whenever the competency of counsel is at-
tacked. In the Simmons case the defendant was charged and found
guilty of having sexual intercourse with a child. The defendant was
represented by a court-appointed counsel until after conviction at
1. Whitmore v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 706, 203 N.W.2d 56 (1973).
2. State ex rel White v. Gray, 57 Wis. 2d 17, 203 N.W.2d 638 (1972).
3. State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973).
4. 57 Wis. 2d 285, 203 N.W.2d 887 (1973).
